Why Microsoft 365 Admin Accounts Are Riskier Than You Think

In this blog post Why Microsoft 365 Admin Accounts Are Riskier Than You Think we will explain why excessive administrator access creates a serious business risk, how Microsoft 365 controls that access, and what your IT team should check.

Most businesses protect employee accounts but pay less attention to the accounts that control Microsoft 365 itself. That is a problem because one compromised administrator can potentially change security settings, access company information, create new accounts and lock legitimate users out.

What is a Microsoft 365 administrator account?

Microsoft 365 administrator accounts manage the services your employees use every day, including Outlook, Teams, SharePoint and OneDrive. They can also control Microsoft Intune, which manages and secures company devices, and Microsoft Defender, which helps detect and respond to cyber threats.

The permissions behind these accounts are managed through Microsoft Entra ID, Microsoft’s system for controlling user identities, sign-ins and access. Different administrator roles are available for different jobs, from resetting passwords to managing the entire Microsoft 365 environment.

The most powerful role is Global Administrator. A person with this role can make changes across almost every Microsoft cloud service connected to your organisation.

That level of access is sometimes necessary. The risk begins when it is given to too many people, used for everyday work or left active long after it is needed.

Why admin accounts are such attractive targets

An attacker who steals a normal employee account may gain access to one mailbox and a limited amount of company data. An attacker who takes over an administrator account can potentially weaken the security controls protecting everyone.

They may be able to reset passwords, create additional administrator accounts, change sign-in policies or approve a malicious application. They could also make their activity harder to detect by altering alerts or security settings.

This is why admin security deserves separate attention from general Microsoft 365 security. As discussed in our guide to Microsoft 365 security blind spots, a system can appear to be working perfectly while serious weaknesses remain hidden underneath.

Five admin account risks businesses often overlook

1. Administrators use the same account for email and system changes

One of the most common mistakes is allowing an IT employee to use a Global Administrator account as their normal work account. They read email, open documents, browse websites and manage Microsoft 365 using the same identity.

This dramatically increases exposure. A convincing phishing email or malicious document can place the organisation’s most powerful credentials at risk.

Administrators should have a standard account for email, Teams and everyday work, plus a separate admin account used only when making authorised changes. This simple separation reduces the number of opportunities an attacker has to capture privileged access.

Business outcome: A successful phishing attack against an employee is less likely to become a company-wide security incident.

2. Too many people have Global Administrator access

Global Administrator access is often granted because it is convenient. It avoids working out which smaller role a staff member or IT provider actually needs.

Convenience creates risk. Someone who only resets passwords does not need the ability to change every Microsoft 365 security control. They can be assigned a Password Administrator role instead.

This approach is called least privilege. In plain English, each person receives only the access required to do their job and nothing more.

For most businesses with 50 to 500 employees, the number of permanent Global Administrators should be very small. Every assignment should have a clear owner and a documented business reason.

Business outcome: Fewer accounts can make high-impact changes, reducing both cyber risk and the chance of an expensive human error.

3. Multi-factor authentication is present but not strong enough

Multi-factor authentication, or MFA, asks users for an additional form of verification beyond a password. It is an important control, but not every MFA method provides the same protection.

Attackers can sometimes trick users into approving a phone notification or entering a temporary code into a fake sign-in page. Administrator accounts should therefore use phishing-resistant MFA wherever practical.

Phishing-resistant methods include passkeys and physical security keys. These methods verify the legitimate sign-in service rather than relying on the administrator to recognise a convincing fake page.

Access should also be controlled with carefully designed sign-in policies. Our article on Conditional Access mistakes explains how small policy gaps can undermine otherwise strong account protection.

Business outcome: Stolen passwords become much less useful to an attacker, lowering the likelihood of account takeover.

4. Old staff and IT providers still have access

Admin access often accumulates quietly. A former employee may still have an account, a contractor may retain permissions after a project, or an old technology provider may still be connected to the Microsoft 365 environment.

These accounts are easy to miss because they may not appear in normal staff reports. Some external providers use delegated access, which allows them to manage a client’s Microsoft environment through their own systems.

Delegated access is useful when properly controlled. However, your business should know which providers have access, what they can manage and when that access was last reviewed.

Administrator access reviews should be completed regularly and whenever an employee, contractor or service provider leaves. Access that no longer has a clear purpose should be removed promptly.

Business outcome: Your organisation closes forgotten entry points and gains clearer control over who can access sensitive systems.

5. There is no safe emergency access plan

Stronger security policies can occasionally lock out legitimate administrators. An identity service outage, a policy error or the loss of an administrator’s authentication device can leave the business unable to manage Microsoft 365.

Organisations should maintain two dedicated cloud-only emergency access accounts. These are sometimes called break-glass accounts because they are used only when normal administrator access is unavailable.

The credentials must be stored securely, monitored for any use and tested through a controlled process. They should never be used for routine administration, email or web browsing.

Business outcome: The business can recover from an access failure without creating an everyday security shortcut.

A common scenario in a growing business

Consider a 180-person professional services company that has used Microsoft 365 for several years. The internal IT manager, two support employees, the previous IT provider and several contractors have all received administrator access at different times.

Microsoft 365 continues to operate normally, so management assumes the environment is secure. A review later finds multiple permanent Global Administrators, an inactive contractor account and an admin identity used daily for email.

The solution does not require replacing Microsoft 365. The company separates daily and administrative accounts, removes unnecessary roles, strengthens MFA, reviews external provider access and creates monitored emergency accounts.

The result is a smaller attack surface, clearer accountability and less chance that one stolen account could disrupt the whole business.

How admin account security supports Essential Eight compliance

Restricting administrative privileges is part of the Essential Eight, the Australian government’s cybersecurity framework designed to help organisations reduce common security risks. Multi-factor authentication is another core part of the framework.

Simply owning Microsoft security licences does not mean these controls are properly implemented. Businesses need evidence showing who has privileged access, why they need it, how it is protected and when it was reviewed.

This matters for organisations responding to customer security questionnaires, cyber insurance renewals, government contracts and internal compliance reviews. It also supports practical risk management under Australian privacy obligations.

What should your IT team check?

• How many active Global Administrator accounts exist?
• Does every administrator use a separate account for everyday work?
• Are admin accounts protected by strong, preferably phishing-resistant MFA?
• Do people have only the administrator role needed for their job?
• Can admin accounts sign in from personal or unmanaged devices?
• Do former employees, contractors or previous IT providers retain access?
• Are administrator role changes and unusual sign-ins monitored?
• Are two secure emergency access accounts available and regularly tested?
• Is privileged access reviewed and documented at least quarterly?

Device security is also important because even a well-protected administrator account can be exposed on an unsafe computer. Our guide to unmanaged devices accessing Microsoft 365 explains what business leaders should ask their IT team to verify.

Admin access should be temporary where possible

More mature environments can use Privileged Identity Management, a Microsoft Entra feature that provides administrator access only when it is needed. Instead of holding powerful permissions permanently, an authorised person activates a role for a limited period.

The activation can require MFA, approval and a business reason. Access then expires automatically, leaving a record for future security or compliance reviews.

This reduces standing access without slowing down legitimate IT work. It is particularly valuable when several internal employees, contractors and service providers help manage the environment.

Protect the accounts that protect everything else

Microsoft 365 admin accounts are the keys to your company’s email, files, identities, devices and security controls. They should not be treated like ordinary employee accounts.

The strongest approach combines separate admin identities, limited permissions, phishing-resistant MFA, trusted devices, regular access reviews, monitoring and a tested emergency plan. The goal is not to make administration difficult. It is to ensure one mistake or stolen password cannot become a business-wide crisis.

CloudProInc is a Melbourne-based Microsoft Partner and Wiz Security Integrator with more than 20 years of enterprise IT experience. We help organisations across Australia review Microsoft 365, Entra ID, Intune, Defender and cloud security controls without the overhead of a large, faceless provider.

If you are not sure who currently has administrator access to your Microsoft 365 environment, or whether those accounts are properly protected, we are happy to take a practical look with you — no strings attached.